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Corporation tax is a material cost for companies, making corporate tax planning a 
crucial activity (Hardeck and Hertl 2014; Kubick et al 2015).  Traditionally the 
objective of companies’ corporate tax strategy (CTS) was to minimise the tax cost, 
as part of the directors’ fiduciary duty to their investors to maximise shareholder post 
tax profits (Wahab and Holland 2012).   With this objective as the sole focus, the 
corporate tax function operated in isolation; it had little regard for the impact on other
stakeholders. By reducing their tax burden, corporations (i) deprive governments of 
vital tax receipts, essential to funding key public services and (ii) potentially transfer 
the tax burden onto other tax payers such as small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and individuals.   The traditional corporate tax reporting environment 
permitted such corporate tax behaviour to go unnoticed.    Significant changes, 
however, in the contemporary tax environment means that companies’ CTS now 
need to embrace more than just good cost management of their corporation tax 
liability. 
Two other essential factors that this chapter will explore are the ethical stance of the 
CTS and the management of the increasingly stringent compliance and disclosure 
requirements of the tax regimes in which companies operate.  With respect to the 
first factor, globalisation has increased the range of tax planning opportunities for 
companies that operate internationally.  There are, however, large overseas 
operators which have made aggressive use of the tax planning opportunities 
presented.  This has led to a very animated debate whether companies pay their fair 
share of tax leading to intense public scrutiny of the ethical stance of companies’ 
CTS. There is a great risk of damage to a company’s legitimacy, reputation, brand 
relations and brand equity should the public perceive a company’s CTS to be 
immoral.  As for the stringent compliance and disclosure requirements, it is essential 
that companies proactively manage this aspect.  There is a high risk of punitive 
penalties and sanctions where a company fails to comply with the compliance or 
disclosure regulations of the various tax regimes it operates. 
Consequently, the CTS of corporations now must look beyond just efficient cost 
management of their corporation tax liability.  They need to consider the ethics of the
CTS and what measures to adopt to reduce the risk of failure and the associated 
consequences of not fulfilling the compliance requirements.  
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5.2 The Cost Component
The corporation tax cost to a company is based on its taxable profits, as calculated 
in accordance with the regulations of the tax regime where the value has been 
created and taxed at the prevailing corporation tax rate.  It is potentially a significant 
cost for a company, reducing shareholder wealth (Hardeck and Hertl 2014; Kubick et
al 2015). It is the fiduciary duty of directors to maximise shareholder wealth, by 
managing their business costs; this includes the management of the corporation tax 
liability. As such it is appropriate that companies adopt tax planning activities to 
manage this cost efficiently.  Not only is it a fiduciary duty for directors in some 
countries to promote the success of the company, but it can also be a legal duty; for 
example in the UK, under section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 “A director of a 
company must act in a way he considers, in good faith, would be the most likely to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole..” 
(Scott Slorach and Ellis 2017, p72).   
Traditionally tax planning focused on the timing of revenues and expenses, and by 
companies making use of the tax reliefs and incentives available.   This landscape 
began to change as companies started to expand their operations overseas. The 
internationalisation of business brought a proliferation of cross border transactions, 
an increase in capital and labour mobility, the growth of intellectual property and the 
associated royalties, as well as the rise of internationally active businesses, 
especially Multinational Enterprises (MNEs).  As a result corporations are now able 
to operate in numerous tax jurisdictions all with different tax rules and regulations, all
proactively competing for the foreign direct investment (FDI) these organisations 
bring.  This has provided a wealth of new opportunities for corporate tax planning.  
One such opportunity is exploiting the differences in international corporation tax 
rates.  For example the lowest tax rate of OECD (Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development) members as at April 2017 was levied by Switzerland,
8.5% in contrast the highest corporation tax rate levied was 35% by the United 
States (OECD 2017).  Such differences have led to corporations, especially MNEs, 
establishing their taxable presence in locations with low or minimal tax rates, such as
tax havens thereby “…significantly minimising their total tax payments.” (Kyj and 
Romeo 2015, p298).  According to these authors almost 15% of the world tax 
regimes are tax havens, providing many opportunities for companies to structure 
their operations so that taxable income is taxed in tax havens at much lower rates. 
Another popular tax planning device is transfer pricing. Transfer pricing enables 
corporations to benefit from the different corporation tax rates across the world 
(Hardeck and Hertl 2014).  Whilst it is based on commercial accounting practices, it 
has become a popular technique whereby group companies divert taxable profits to 
related companies located in lower tax jurisdictions (Kyj and Romeo 2015).  An 
example of this tax planning device was used by Starbucks UK when they purchased
the green coffee beans from a Swiss affiliate at much higher prices than normal 
commercial rates. Another example of transfer pricing is through the use of intra-
Sensitivity: Internal
group loans to subsidiaries.  Finance costs for the borrower are often a tax allowable
expense, although there may be criteria to be satisfied first.  By ensuring that the 
lender is located in a lower tax rate jurisdiction, groups of companies can shift profits 
by charging interest rates above commercial arm length’s rates.  Starbucks is again 
an example of where this technique was used (Campbell and Helloid 2016).  
A third tax planning opportunity for companies, lies around the fact that many tax 
regimes have different definitions of corporation tax residency. This allows 
companies to generate income in a country without necessarily being classified as 
tax resident in that country and so the income escapes taxation. In the UK, 
companies that are either incorporated in the UK or centrally managed and 
controlled in the UK, are deemed to be UK resident for corporation tax purposes.  In 
contrast the tax residency in Ireland is defined according to where the functional 
management of the company is, so companies can be incorporated in Ireland, but if 
their functional management is elsewhere the income arising in Ireland avoids 
taxation.  In their study of Microsoft, Kyj and Romeo (2015) found that the company 
incorporated two interrelated subsidiaries in Ireland, but ensured the functional 
management and control of one of them was overseas in a tax haven.  Known as the
‘Double-Irish’ it minimises the tax due by the companies involved in the arrangement;
yet simultaneously the Irish subsidiaries provide the group  with several commercial 
benefits, namely the free access Ireland gives to Euro-zone countries and access to 
a stable currency, the Euro, so there is less exposure to currency fluctuations.  
Another popular combination of countries with different tax residency rules, used 
very effectively in reducing the corporation tax burden by Apple Inc,and software 
companies such as Microsoft Inc, is the Double-Irish technique (Kyj and Romeo 
2015). Kyj and Romeo (2015, p297) describe this technique as a “….method relies 
on Irish law, under which a company is taxed where it is functionally managed, but 
not necessarily where it is incorporated (territorial taxation). It requires two or more 
interrelated Irish companies to implement, with one of the companies in a tax-haven 
country such as Bermuda or the Cayman Islands.”  Lanis and Richardson (2015) 
identified that Apple Inc saved $US 2.4 billion of tax in 2011 using this residency 
device; in their research Payne and Raiborn (2018) found that Apple Inc generated 
$US 74 million between 2009 and 2012, but paid negligible tax on this income. 
The rise of technology companies has generated another tax planning opportunity.  
Technology companies play a vital role in the economies of many countries, 
therefore numerous tax jurisdictions offer favourable tax incentives for research and 
development costs, such as the US and the UK.  For technology companies, such as
Microsoft Inc., innovation is vital to their long term survival, but the associated 
research and development expenditure is a significant part of their operating cost 
base. According to Kyj and Romeo (2015) the research and development costs for 
Microsoft Inc. were 24% of total operating costs in 2009, reducing to 19% in 2014.   
In their analysis of the tax planning activities of Microsoft Inc., Kyj and Romeo (2015)
found that the company’s research and development activities predominantly 
occurred in the US, where the company benefits from the favourable tax treatment of
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these costs.  The intellectual property rights to the resulting innovations were, 
however, distributed amongst the group’s overseas companies, allowing Microsoft 
Inc. to keep the associate income to the intellectual property rights offshore from the 
US and so avoid the higher US taxation rates (35%).  A convoluted subsidiary 
structure meant most of the associated income was taxed in Bermuda, at 
significantly lower tax rates.
Microsoft is not the only group to manipulate intellectual property rights so that the 
associated royalty income is taxable in lower tax regimes whilst simultaneously tax 
relief for the associated costs is given in tax regimes with higher tax rates.  
Starbucks UK paid royalties to a Swiss affiliate for the use of the Starbucks brand 
and a range of business operations (Campbell and Helloid 2016); the tax benefits of 
this arrangement are explained in more detail in the next section of this chapter.  
These are just a few of the international tax planning opportunities presented to 
corporations.  There are other opportunities such as the benefits of multilateral 
agreements (Klassen and LaPlante 2012), different definitions of various tax regimes
of arms-length transfer prices, or individual tax jurisdictions offering favourable tax 
agreements such as Luxembourg and the Netherlands offered to Fiat and Starbucks 
respectively (Campbell and Helloid 2016).  
There are a vast array of tax planning opportunities available, to assist companies in 
efficiently and effectively managing their corporation tax costs, which are a material 
cost.  However, the ability of large international companies, such as MNEs, to 
employ tax experts, has enabled them to ‘cherry pick’ from these tax planning 
opportunities, in a way Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), micro businesses 
and individuals cannot (Payne and Raiborn 2018).  As Hardeck and Hertl (2015) 
point out this can lead to the burden of corporation tax shifting form the large 
international corporations to these other tax payers who do not have access to such 
tax planning opportunities.  As people have become aware of such inequities there 
has been an increase in the scrutiny of the morality of the tax planning activities of 
corporations, especially international businesses such as MNEs.  The bona fide use 
of the tax planning mechanisms as well as the tax reliefs and incentives available are
considered to be morally acceptable. This is not so where a company’s CTS involves
aggressive tax planning; such CTSs are considered immoral, with stakeholders such
as governments, consumers, public action groups, and the media, all willing to 
expose and tackle such unethical corporate behaviour.   Consequently companies 
now need to consider not just managing their corporation tax cost but also the 
morality of the tax planning activities they adopt. As explored in the next section, 
companies who ignore the ethical component of their CTS risk adverse public 
reaction, negatively impacting their reputation, brand relations and brand equity.
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5.3 The Ethical Component
There is no clear boundary between bona fide tax planning and aggressive tax 
planning.  Neither are illegal.  Both have the objective of reducing company’s 
corporation tax liability, within the bounds of the relevant tax legislation (Datt 2014; 
Lavermicocca and Buchan 2015).  Bona fide tax planning is morally acceptable for it 
merely seeks to release the benefit of the tax reliefs and incentives offered by the 
government under the tax legislation, in a way that is understood to be fair (Datt 
2014).   An underlying principle of UK tax legislation is that the “Taxpayers are 
entitled to organised their financial affairs in such a way so as their tax burden is 
minimised.” (Melville 2018, p12).
In contrast, aggressive tax planning gives rise to tax avoidance, which is not illegal in
itself, but in the words of Margaret Hodges, “immoral” (Datt 2014, p421).  It involves 
the aggressive exploitation of loopholes in the tax legislation, as well as aggressive 
interpretation of the tax legislation. Tax avoidance has serious consequences for 
society.  It erodes the tax base of governments thereby reducing their tax revenue, 
negatively impacting on public services provided (Lanis and Richardson 2015; Payne
and Rayne 2018).  In addition, it transfers the burden of taxation from the tax 
avoiders to other tax payers such as SMEs, micro businesses and individuals who 
do not have access to the tax planning opportunities to which larger corporations 
have access (Hardeck and Hertl 2014).  
The morality of the corporation tax strategies of corporations, especially large 
corporations, has come under increasing scrutiny by governments, the international 
community and the general public (Antonetti and Anesa 2017).  These stakeholders 
expect corporations to be socially responsible, not to engage with tax avoidance, but 
to pay their fair share of tax (Lanis and Richardson 2015; Kanageretnam et al 2016). 
The revelations of the tax avoidance behaviour of such MNEs as Starbucks UK, 
Apple Inc., Google, and Amazon has given rise to a very emotive public debate as to
whether corporations are paying their fair share of tax.  
Yet what constitutes a ‘fair share of tax’ is a very hazy and subjective concept (Datt 
2014).  What is fair to one group of tax payers may not be fair on or to another group
of taxpayers.   For corporations the question is, ‘is it fair for them to pay more tax 
than legally required just because of public sentiment?’  For other taxpayers, the 
question remains, ‘Is it fair that the tax burden gets shifted on them, because of 
unfair tax planning practices of some corporations?’  It is a debate that is likely to run
for years.
The numerous revelations about the aggressive tax planning behaviour of 
corporations, especially MNEs such as Amazon, Apple, Google, Microsoft, and 
Starbucks has put the CTS of many corporations under intense scrutiny by the 
international tax community, domestic tax authorities, and the general public (Kubik 
et al 2015).  Both the international tax community, through such bodies as the 
OECD, and domestic tax authorities have been proactively developing a wide range 
of measures to tackle tax avoidance, for many years.  These include the BEPS 
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(Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) programme by the OECD or the tax avoidance 
measures introduced in the UK such as DOTAS (Declaration of Tax Avoidance 
Schemes).   Measures which some corporations (but not necessarily all) have been 
cooperating with, adapting their CTS over time.   
Meanwhile the general public has also added its voice to the debate.   Investigative 
journalism, public pressure groups, and consumers have each made it clear that 
they will not tolerate tax avoidance by companies.  The case of Starbucks UK in 
2012 is a good example of the adverse public response to the tax avoidance 
behaviour of a company.
Campbell and Helloid (2016) record that by 2012, Starbucks UK had paid minimal 
UK corporation taxes since it began its operations in the UK in 1998, despite 
reporting large profits for its UK operations to its investors, as well as reporting 
billions of pounds of sales, and an 11% growth in revenue. In comparison, Dowling 
(2014) points out that Costa paid an effective UK tax rate of 30.5% for 2010-11.   
The disparity between the high revenue receipts and the minimal corporation tax 
paid by Starbucks was reported by Reuters in late 2012 and investigated by a UK 
Parliamentary Investigative Committee.  
According  to  Campbell  and  Helloid  (2016)  this  tax  situation  arose  due  to  a
combination  of  three  tax  planning  mechanisms;  (i)  the  use  of  intergroup  royalty
payments, (ii) the purchase of coffee beans from a Swiss affiliate at unusually high
prices  and  (iii)  through  intracompany  financing  arrangements.   Firstly  Starbucks
made intragroup royalty payments so that it could use such intellectual property as
the  Starbucks  brand  and a  range  of  business operations;  this  expense  was tax
deductible in calculating UK taxable income.   These royalties were paid to various
overseas affiliated companies diverting the associated taxable profits to tax regimes
that had lower tax rates.  This reduced the effective tax rate of the UK operations to
less than 5% (Campbell and Helloid 2016), at a time when the UK tax rate ranged
between 31% in 1998 (HMRC (a) 2009), reducing to 24% in 2012 (HMRC(b) 2012,
p16).   The second method, transfer pricing, saw the purchase of its green coffee
beans from an affiliated trading company whose legal address was in Switzerland.
The  green  beans  were  purchased  at  unusually  high  prices,  thereby  significantly
reducing the company’s UK taxable income. The corresponding income of the Swiss
affiliate was only taxed at 5%.   The tax advantages gained were further enhanced
by  the  fact  that  the  green  beans  were  then  roasted  in  Netherlands  by  another
Starbucks entity. The cost of the roasted beans to Starbucks UK was a major cost
component  to  Starbucks UK products  sold,  reducing  its  taxable  income,  but  the
corresponding income of the Dutch affiliate was taxed at a lower rate because the
Starbucks  group  had  negotiated  a  preferential  tax  treatment  with  the  Dutch  tax
authorities.  
The third tax planning mechanism that the group aggressively deployed was the use
of intercompany loans to Starbucks UK, where the interest rate charged on these
loans  being  substantially  higher  than  corporate  bond  rate.  Again  the  interest
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payments were an allowable expense against the taxable income of Starbucks UK.
This  meant  that  in  2012,  when  the  relevant  UK  corporation  tax  rate  was  24%,
Starbucks paid £1 million more interest than if it had paid at the corporate bond rate,
saving UK tax of £240,000 (Campbell and Helloid 2016). The combination of these
three tax planning devices enabled Starbucks to generate a loss for UK corporation
tax purposes and so Starbucks UK paid negligible UK corporation tax.
Once this knowledge was in the public domain, activists descended on UK outlets of 
Starbucks. Initially the company tried to defend this CTS, explaining it paid millions of
pounds in other UK taxes such as NIC, as well as contributing to the economy by 
creating thousands of new jobs, and through the supply chain relationships, 
economic activities which themselves contributed to UK tax revenues.  This did not 
appease the public feelings.  In the end the company paid £20 million in voluntary 
tax repayments spread over 2013 and 2014 (Lavermicocca and Buchan 2015; 
Campbell and Helloid 2016; Austin and Wilson 2017).  Yet even this did not pacify 
the public outrage, seeing this tax sweetener as an unacceptable charitable 
donation.  In a public statement on 8 December 2012 the organisation UK Uncut 
denounced the voluntary tax repayments, stating, “Offering to pay some tax if and 
when it suits you does not stop you being a tax dodger.” (Campbell and Helloid 
2016, p48).   The whole situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the 
Starbucks CTS strategy was not congruent with the rest of its Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) strategy issued in 2001. 
This aggressive CTS posed a serious threat to the viability of the company’s UK 
operations.  In the fiscal year 2013 Starbucks experienced its first ever decline in 
sales (Campbell and Helleloid 2016).  In order to restore and protect its reputation 
the company moved its regional head-quarters from Amsterdam to London, knowing 
that this would increase the UK company’s tax cost overall. In 2015 Starbucks UK 
reported a pre-tax profit of £34 million and paid taxes of just over £8 million 
(Campbell and Helleloid 2016).  
The  experience  of  Starbucks UK  is  a  salutary  lesson  of  the  intolerance  of  tax
avoidance practices both tax authorities and the public and the increasing scrutiny of
these stakeholders (Antonetti and Anesa 2017). Lanis and Richardson (2015) and
Kanageretnam et al (2016) all found that stakeholders, particularly governments and
the  public,  are  increasingly  expecting  corporations  to  be  socially  responsible
corporate citizens, not engage with tax avoidance, but to pay their fair share of tax. 
To continue devising CTSs that deploy aggressive tax planning techniques is likely 
to put the company’s legitimacy, reputation, brand relations and brand reputation at 
risk  (Hardeck and Hertl 2014; Andronetti and Anesa 2015; Lavermicocca and 
Buchan 2015; Payne and Raiborn 2018; Austin and Wilson 2017).  It is likely to lead 
to customer boycotts, as experienced by Starbucks UK in 2012.  Research by Payne
and Raiborn (2015) found that about one-third of British consumers were willing to 
boycott companies they perceive as not paying their fair share of tax and that 66% of
Britons believe tax avoidance is morally wrong, with 57% believing it should be made
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illegal.  Yet companies need to be aware that consumer behaviour is potentially 
asymmetric.  Antonetti and Anesa (2017) found that whilst consumers are willing to 
boycott corporations who operate CTS they perceive to be immoral, they were much 
less willing to reward companies by paying a price premium because that company 
practices acceptable tax planning.
A further risk of aggressive tax planning, as Kubik et al (2015) point out, is that it is 
likely to undermine the public trust in companies, exposing them to accusations of 
greed and dishonesty.  The trust of stakeholders is an essential component of the 
relationship between a company and its stakeholders, as well as being vital to the 
company growth, but has been damaged in recent years, partly due to the 2007 
financial crisis and partly due to the aggressive tax behaviour of companies (PwC 
2013; Kubik et al 2015).  
The general public (particularly consumers, the media and public action groups) 
potentially have a powerful voice. In their report PwC (2013) noted that 97% of CEOs
surveyed believed customers and clients are the most influential stakeholder.  In 
their paper, Lavermicocca and Buchan (2015) identified that 40% of CEOs agreed 
that the media influenced the company’s strategy and 12% acknowledged this 
influence was significant.  In the same paper 76% of the CFOs surveyed were of the 
opinion that the media’s focus on companies’ CTS was detrimental to the company’s
reputation.  In particular investigative journalism, together with the work of public 
action groups (such as The Tax Justice Network, Occupy Movement, Uncut UK, 
Uncut US, Action Aid), play a key role in identifying and exposing corporations who 
are considered to have not paid their fair share of tax or have been perceived to 
have practised aggressive tax planning (Datt 2014; Hardeck and Hertl 2014; 
Lavermicocca and Buchan 2015; Kanageretnam et al 2016).  As Starbucks UK 
experienced in 2012, this voice can be immensely powerful.
When managing these risks to reputation, brand relations and brand equity 
companies need to be highly mindful of the risks posed by social media.   As PwC 
(2013) and Eckert (2016) point out social media can see the rapid dissemination of 
negative information about a company on an extensive scale; the risk is further 
aggravated by the fact that social media messages tend be very succinct, blunt even
brutal in their form and the information is readily available, often in great detail.  This 
acute risk is difficult for companies to manage and the damage can be extensive 
(PwC 2013).  
One of the by-products of all these risks is that investors, are now also becoming
increasingly  concerned  about  unethical  corporate  tax  behaviour.   Wahab  and
Holland  (2012),  building  on  the  research  of  Desai  and  Dharmapala  (2009)  and
Wilson  (2009),  (as  cited  in  Wahab  and  Holland  (2012)),  concluded  that  UK
shareholders no  longer  value  tax  planning.    This  is  due  to  the  information
asymmetry between directors and shareholders in respect of tax planning, giving rise
to either a moral hazard or a fear of a moral hazard.  There is a risk, therefore, that
tax planning is likely to reduce shareholder value.  Wahab and Holland (2012), found
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that in UK corporates, good corporate governance procedures did not moderate this
outcome (unlike Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Wilson (2009, as cited in Wahab
and Holland (2012), who found that in US corporations good corporate governance
reduced shareholder concern and the risk to equity value).
The risks that all this poses to a company’s reputation, brand relations and brand 
equity are risks that companies ignore at their peril; they need to be embraced as an 
essential part of their CTS. One approach advocated by Lanis and Richardson 
(2015) and Antonetti and Anesa (2017) is to adopt a more conservative CTS that is 
perceived to be fair and ethical, particularly if it is included in the company’s CSR 
policy. For the public such an approach demonstrates the company is socially 
responsible and a good corporate citizen.  Lanis and Richardson (2015), in their 
research of US listed companies, found that companies with a higher CSR were 
associated with a lower level of tax avoidance and so receive more public support.  
Research by Hardeck and Hertl (2015) similarly found that consumers with high tax 
morals are more likely to have a negative attitude towards a company they perceive 
to be operating an aggressive CTS, thereby undermining corporate success.  
Likewise Eckert (2016) found that new customers were more likely to form a 
relationship with companies perceived to have a positive CSR.  
An alternative approach for UK companies is to seek to be accredited with the Fair 
Tax Mark (FTM).  The objective of the FTM is to certify that the accredited company 
“…is paying the right amount of tax in the rght place at the right time and applying 
the gold standard of tax transparency.” (Fair Tax n.d.b).  Founded in 2014 the Fair 
Tax Mark Ltd, as a not-for-profit organisation, was established to ensure a level 
playing field for firms to pay their fair share of tax and encourage businesses to show
responsible tax leadership and improve transparency, ensuring taxable income is 
taxed in the place value is created, not shifted to lower tax regimes (Fair Tax n.d.a; 
Fair Tax n.d.b).  The FTM is supported by the Tax Justice Network and assisted by 
the Ethical Consumer Research Association.  It gives publicity to businesses 
operating a responsible and transparent CTS, providing a map so that consumers 
can easily locate them. It has helped build up trust between business accredited with
a FTM, such that, for example:   “64% people trust a business with a Fair Tax Trade 
mark than one without it” and “77% of people would shop in favour of a company 
which can prove it is paying its fair share of tax” (Fair Tax Mark n.d.c).  SSE was the 
first FTSE-listed business to achieve the FTM; other companies include Lush 
Cosmetics (UK’s first high street retailer to achieve the Fair Trade Mark), the Co-Op 
group and now increasingly more.
Corporations now face increasing scrutiny of the ethical stance of their CTS by many
stakeholders.  Where such stakeholders perceive the company not to be paying their
fair share of tax, the company risks significant damage to their legitimacy, reputation,
brand relations and brand equity, as evidenced by the experience of Starbucks UK in
2012.  The risk is heightened by such factors as the ready availability of information, 
and dissemination mechanisms such as social media.  Such risks that cannot be 
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ignored when devising a CTS. CTS can no longer just focus on managing their 
corporation tax cost, but need to embrace a more moral stance, that is transparent.  
The next section examinations the final aspect this chapter reviews, that is the 
management of compliance costs and risks that companies need to consider when 
adopting and operating a CTS.  
5.4 The Compliance Component
The importance of  taxation to  governments cannot  be  underestimated.   It  is  the
biggest source of revenue for the government, the only practical means of raising the
large amounts required to fund key public services and is a vital tool in managing
their economy to ensure economic growth  (Mirrlees et al 2011; James and Nobes
2013; Datt 2014; Payne and Raiborn 2018; OECD 2017).  Through the symbiotic
relationship  between  taxation  and  the  economy,  governments  can  use  their  tax
system to  generate  vital  government  revenue,  promote  research and innovation,
productivity and  inclusive  growth.   This  is  a  challenging  balance  to  achieve,
especially post the 2008 financial crisis, as governments have tried to protect and
nurture the fragile economic recovery, whilst simultaneously overcoming enormous
fiscal debt and rebuilding their fiscal position.
In order to protect this source of revenue, tax jurisdictions, especially in advanced
economies, operate a rigorous compliance environment.  The purpose is not only to
deter tax avoidance, but to ensure corporations make full and accurate declarations
of their taxable income, as well as pay the associated corporation tax liability in full
and on time.  This is often enforced by stringent penalties and actions, alongside
extensive investigative powers of the tax authorities.  
To this  end,  individual  tax jurisdictions and the international  tax community have
been developing tax systems that  ensure corporations contribute fairly to the tax
revenue of all the countries in which they operate and create value (Lavermicocca
and Buchan 2015). This is principally achieved by establishing robust tax compliance
environments,  targeting  harmful  tax  practices,  tackling  base  erosion  and  profit
shifting, and driving greater transparency and accountability.  It is a challenging task
for both the international tax community and for domestic tax jurisdictions, given the
complexity of the business environment.   
The OECD is the key agent working on behalf  of  the international community to
tackle such issues as tax avoidance.  The OECD has led the way in respect  of
international tax issues for over 50 years resulting in major advances in tackling tax
avoidance, tax evasion and making the international tax system stronger and fairer
(OECD  2017),  successfully  implementing  a  range  of  policies  to  improve  tax
disclosure, transparency and address tax avoidance.  The OECD has developed
standards  for  exchange  of  information  between  tax  authorities,  in  particular  the
Common Reporting Standard (CRS).  The CRS requires the automatic exchange of
financial  account  information  between tax authorities (AEOI)  facilitated  through a
Common Transmission System; 98 members have committed to implementing the
CRS in 2017 or 2018 (OECD 2016; OECD 2017).  Furthermore the OECD Global
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Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, which has
132 country members, is developing a tax transparency standard in respect of the
Exchange  of  Information  on  Request  (EOIR)  (OECD 2016).   Not  only  do  these
targeted  measures on  transparency  tackle  tax  avoidance,  but  also  encompass
money laundering activities.   In addition to the CRS, the AEOI and the EOIR, the
OECD have pioneered other tax avoidance measures, including the BEPS project
(Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) with over 100 jurisdictions involved; the OECD tax
treaty model tax convention and tax inspectors without borders (OECD 2017).  
Unilaterally, various tax jurisdictions have also been adopting a range of measures to
achieve greater transparency and public accountability.   In some instances these
measures have been legislative such as in Australia and the UK.   Australia have
established  the  ASX Corporate  Governance  Principles  which  require  companies
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, to act ethically and responsibly, including in
respect of their CTS (Lavermicocca and Buchan 2015). The Australian Tax Office
also requires mining companies with total  income of $AU 100 million or more to
publish a range of corporation tax information.
Another  tax  jurisdiction that  has  introduced  accountability and  transparency
legislation is  the UK.  Under  new measures introduced in  the Finance Act  2016
Schedule 19 designated large businesses operating in the UK are required to publish
their  tax strategy in  respect  of  their  UK tax position and responsibilities.   These
designated businesses were qualifying UK companies, partnerships, qualifying UK
groups, and qualifying UK sub-groups of foreign MNEs, which in the previous tax
year had turnover that exceeded £200 million or the balance sheet exceeded £200
billion (Fair Tax 2017).  It is aimed at increasing the transparency of the CTS of such
companies, thereby discouraging aggressive tax behaviour.  Designated businesses
are  responsible  for  the  CTS,  which  must  be  published  annually.   Under  the
legislation designated businesses were required to publish their CTS, free of charge,
on the internet before the end of the company’s first financial year commencing after
15 September 2016. No publication will lead to penalties. The objective is to provide
the  general  public  with  information,  on  a  country-by-country  basis,  about  the
approach the company adopts in respect of the management of risk and governance
of their UK tax position.  In the published CTS the executive must disclose its attitude
to tax planning and the level of risk the group is prepared to accept regarding their
UK tax position. It must also detail the company’s approach to their dealings with the
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).  
At the time of writing it is difficult to evaluate the benefits of such legislation.  Whilst
aimed  at  improving  transparency and  accountability,  there  is  no  guarantee  that
legislation of this nature will provide sufficient assurance that the company is paying
their fair share of tax.   Furthermore there is a risk that the additional disclosures will
be misunderstood by the public at large as the general public may not understand
the legal and technical intricacies to properly evaluate the CTS information available.
Certainly there is some evidence at the time of writing indicating poor compliance
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with Schedule 19.  To date research published by Fair Trade Mark (2017) in October
2017 found that only 17 (34%) of the FTSE 50 companies had published their CTS
online  by  30  June  2017;  the  remaining  two-thirds  had  failed  to  respond  to  the
Schedule 19 requirements. Of the 17 that had published their CTS by 30 June 2017,
11 demonstrated basic compliance or less.  Of the total FTSE 50 companies only 6
companies (12%) demonstrated compliance that was ‘good’ or better.  On the face of
this, this would appear to be a poor response to this mandatory legislation, but as yet
companies may still be within the required timeline of publishing before the end of
the company’s first accounting period commencing after 15 September 2016.
There are other examples of tax disclosure requirements implemented by individual
tax  regimes,  for  example,  the  DOTAS (Declaration  of  Tax  Avoidance  Schemes)
regulations in the UK or the use by the tax authorities in New Zealand and Italy of
questionnaires to target certain taxpayers in certain risk areas. Other countries have
adopted advance rulings mechanisms, penalty linked disclosure rules (for example
Ireland), co-operative compliance programmes (for example Australia, Ireland, The
Netherlands, Italy, Spain, UK and the USA), or have additional reporting obligations
(for  example,  The Netherlands,  Italy,  USA).   Disclosure initiatives such as these
promote greater compliance and create a more level playing field for all tax payers.
Such transparency and accountability legislation compounds the compliance risk to
which corporations are now exposed to.  Many international tax regimes now have
robust  compliance  regimes  with  stringent  penalties  and  sanctions for  non-
compliance  in  respect  of  the  accuracy,  completeness  and  timeliness  of  the
submission of tax returns and tax payments.  Whether a company just operates in
one tax  jurisdiction,  or  several,  they  now operate  in  a  complex  international  tax
environment.  They have a myriad of complex tax regulations to navigate across a
range of different  tax jurisdictions;  the UK tax system alone contains over 8,000
pages of tax legislation (Mirrlees 2001).  The corporate tax environment, especially
for  companies  operating  internationally,  is  a  dynamic  environment  with  tax
regulations  being  constantly  updated  and  revised  in  response  to  the  constantly
changing business environment and socio-economic and political  influences.  The
risk of default, however unintentional and accidental, is now much higher, bringing
unwelcome and costly penalties and sanctions.  To avoid such punitive responses
from  the  tax  authorities,  companies  need  to  ensure  their  CTS secures  the
submission of tax returns and payments that are accurate, complete and timely in
each and every tax jurisdiction they operate, as well  as meeting all  the requisite
disclosure requirements.  This  requires a  range of  dedicated resources,  including
investment in the experience and training of high quality tax professionals, whether
internally sourced or out sourced; tax professionals who are supported in keeping up
to date with the frequent changes in tax legislation.  
Another key investment is the need for reliable and rigorous accounting information
systems and internal controls in place that enable them to effectively manage the
compliance risks they face.  Such systems and internal controls need to ensure that
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companies  have calculated  their  tax  position correctly;  provide  disclosure that  is
accurate, complete and timely, as well as provide assurance that tax payments are
properly and in a timely manner.  Such systems and internal controls are essential to
minimise the risk of non-compliance and need to be embraced as an essential part
of contemporary CTS.  This is especially true for those companies that operate in
multiple  jurisdictions,  as  the  compliance  regime  in  each  one  will  have  its  own
requirements.  In addition, an inescapable aspect of tax compliance risk is ensuring
access to professional tax advisors with the necessary expertise, whether that facility
is in-house or out-sourced.  It is a vital part of properly managing the tax compliance
risk, escalating the dead weight of compliance costs.
Overall  companies need to  adopt  a  CTS that  recognises and addresses the tax
compliance risks to which corporations are exposed to.  This involves managing the
compliance risks of correctly declaring their tax position in good time, and ensuring
prompt and full payment of the associate tax liability in each tax jurisdiction, but it
extends beyond this.   Companies’  CTS also  need to  recognise  the  need to  co-
operate with the transparency and accountability requirements of both individual tax
jurisdictions and the international tax community, whether this is formal legislation,
political enquiry or agreed international practice.   These strands produce a complex
tax compliance environment.   It  requires a robust  response from corporations to
efficiently and effectively manage the associated risks.
5.5 Conclusion  
The traditional need of CTS to embrace efficient and effective tax planning still 
remains.  The fiduciary duty of directors of maximising shareholder wealth remains a 
fundamental aspect (Datt 2014).  It is now no longer, however, the only 
consideration.  Now they must navigate through a much more complex corporation 
tax environment, particularly when they operate in more than one tax jurisdiction.  
Whilst globalisation has opened up a wealth of new tax planning opportunities, 
companies are now under immense pressure from the public and the government to 
deploy these opportunities in a fair manner that evidences they are paying their fair 
share of tax. These stakeholders now have a strong voice, requiring companies to 
be good corporate citizens and pay their fair of share of tax.  Consumers, the media 
and public action groups are highly proactive in scrutinising the tax positions of 
companies.  They are increasingly vocal if they suspect corporations have not been 
paying their fair share of tax, with a very powerful voice.  If such stakeholders 
consider that the company have not paid their fair share of tax, then the company’s 
legitimacy, reputation, brand relations and brand equity are at great risk.  However, 
where corporations can demonstrate that their CTS is ethical and that they are good 
corporate citizens, then they reduce such risks.  To that end companies that have 
highly acceptable CSR policies are often considered to be good corporate citizens.
A crucial element of managing this tax risk is controlling the information available. 
This is much easier said than done.  Information about companies’ tax position is 
much more readily available and disseminated.  The media and public action groups 
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are proactive in obtaining and publicising this information.  Social media facilitates 
the instant, extensive and brutal dissemination of sensitive information that can be 
very damaging.  
Another key element of CTS is the management of the tax compliance risk.  The 
complexity of tax compliance legislation domestically and internationally makes this 
very challenging.  It requires access to relevant, up-to-date expertise, plus the 
investment in appropriate accounting information systems with strong internal 
controls to minimise such risks.  The risks surrounding tax compliance are not just 
restricted to timely disclosure and submission of accurate and complete information 
of the company’s tax position and effecting prompt payments of the correct amount 
of tax.  It must also recognise the risk of non-compliance with a wide range of 
disclosure and accountability measures adopted by both domestic tax regimes and 
the international community. Failure to fulfil the compliance requirements, however 
inadvertent, exposes the company to costly sanctions and penalties.
Today’s contemporary reporting environment is much more exacting and unforgiving 
of companies and their CTS.  To ignore the resultant tax risks would be folly indeed. 
Today the fiduciary duty of directors can no longer solely focus on reducing the 
corporation tax cost, in order to maximise shareholder wealth.  Today there are other
threats to shareholder equity, namely more stringent compliance regimes, greater 
intolerance by both tax authorities and the public of tax aggressive behaviour.  To 
manage such threats, directors need to adopt a more proactive approach in devising 
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